On a Democratic Future: Nietzsche, Derrida, and Democracy to Come by Bennett, Matthew
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following ad supports maintaining our C.E.E.O.L. service 
 
 
ON A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE: NIETZSCHE, DERRIDA, AND DEMOCRACY TO
COME
«ON A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE: NIETZSCHE, DERRIDA, AND DEMOCRACY TO
COME»
by Matthew P. Bennett
Source:
Studia Universitatis Babes­Bolyai ­ Philosophia (Studia Universitatis Babes­Bolyai ­ Philosophia), issue: 1
/ 2012, pages: 103­120, on www.ceeol.com.
STUDIA UBB. PHILOSOPHIA, Vol. 57 (2012), No. 1, pp. 103 - 120 
(RECOMMENDED CITATION) 
 
 
ON A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE:  
NIETZSCHE, DERRIDA, AND DEMOCRACY TO COME 
 
 
 
MATTHEW P. BENNETT 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT. In this paper I analyse and critically assess Jacques Derrida’s political 
reading of Nietzsche. Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche’s multiple styles and their 
ramifications for how we read philosophical texts is well known. But Derrida also 
maintained that Nietzsche’s addresses to an unknown future readership evidenced 
a democratic aspect to Nietzsche’s work. Derrida’s is a heretofore unexamined 
interpretation, and in this paper I aim to show that his emphasis on the democratic 
style of Nietzsche’s writing raises different questions about the kind of political 
values that support Nietzsche’s critique of modernity. I argue that Derrida’s reading 
merits discussion, particularly in virtue of its intriguing account of what it means 
to experience the future democratically. However, I think Derrida’s reading has its 
own exegetical and philosophical problems. In sections one and two I explain why 
Derrida thought that Nietzsche’s hopes for the future of Europe constitute a democratic 
comportment; in section three I show how this reading of Nietzsche can be defended 
against a philosophical objection to its plausibility; and in section four I suggest 
exegetical reasons for questioning Derrida’s interpretation. I will end by drawing on 
Nietzsche’s work to raise an objection to the political quietism of democracy to come.  
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Some accounts of Nietzsche would have us believe that his work was 
unequivocally anti-democratic. We are told by some that Nietzsche’s anti-egalitarianism, 
elitism, aristocratism, and distaste for nineteenth-century democratic politics are 
wholly incompatible with pro-democratic political theory.1 Relatively recent study 
of Nietzsche has countered this orthodox understanding of his political views. 
Readers such as Lawrence Hatab, David Owen, Mark Warren, and William Connolly 
have made a variety of attempts to argue that some contemporary democratic theory is 
                                                     
 University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, mbenneb@essex.ac.uk 
1 See, for example: Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche Contra Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999); Don Dombowsky, ‘A Response to Alan D. Schrift’s “Nietzsche For Democracy?”,’ 
Nietzsche-Studien 29 (2000); and Herman W. Siemens, ‘Nietzsche’s Critique of Democracy (1870-1886),’ 
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 38 (2009).  
MATTHEW P. BENNETT 
 
 
 104 
compatible with and perhaps even supported by Nietzsche’s work.2 These readings 
have added to an emerging body of literature that addresses a broader range of 
political issues raised by Nietzsche;3 we might say that now more than ever before 
Anglo-American Nietzsche scholarship not only accepts Nietzsche as a significant 
figure in moral theory, but also as a possible contributor to political philosophy. 
Debate over the democratic credentials of Nietzsche’s philosophy has tended 
to focus on his potentially conflicting themes of an emancipating pluralism on the 
one hand, and domination, hierarchy and ‘healthy aristocracy’ on the other (see for 
instance Beyond Good and Evil  §258). Those who write of a democratic Nietzsche 
will locate democratic thought in his resistance to the dogmatism of ‘universal’ values. 
They will argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism, insofar as it insists on a multiplicity 
of values and truths engaged in agonistic debate, is a democratic philosophy. 
Conversely, those who have argued against the validity of a democratic Nietzsche have 
emphasised his anti-egalitarianism, claiming that Nietzsche’s belief in the difference in 
worth between individuals is irreconcilable with democratic principles of equality.4  
In this paper I aim to reconstruct Derrida’s position on this issue. Derrida’s 
account of Nietzsche has the virtue of acknowledging the themes emphasised by 
both pro- and anti-democratic Nietzsche interpretations, while avoiding their problems. 
Derrida’s contribution to the issue of Nietzsche’s potential for democratic thought 
is to reflect on how Nietzsche oriented himself to his contemporary culture and in 
particular how he did this with a certain attitude toward the future of this culture. 
Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche ultimately lead him to claim that Nietzsche’s orientation 
toward the future is characteristically democratic. I hope to explain what Derrida 
                                                     
2 See William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Lawrence J. Hatab, 
A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: an Experiment in Postmodern Politics (Chicago: Open Court, 
1995); David Owen, Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity: a Critique of Liberal Reason (London: Sage, 
1995); Alan D. Schrift, ‘Nietzsche for Democracy?’ Nietzsche-Studien 29 (2000); Alan D. Schrift, 
‘Nietzschean Agonism and the Subject of Radical Democracy’ Selected Studies in Phenomenology and 
Existential Philosophy 27 (2001); and Mark E. Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1988). 
3 The development of this area of the literature is perhaps best reflected in two recent publications from 
Peter Sedgwick (Nietzsche: the Key Concepts, (New York: Routledge, 2009)), and Frank Cameron and 
Don Dombowsky (Political Writings of Friedrich Nietzsche (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)). It is not 
insignificant that Sedgwick has saw fit to include a section on Nietzsche’s politics, in which he addresses 
among other interpretations the recent surge in readings that propose a democratic Nietzsche. Nor can we 
ignore Cameron and Dombowsky’s decision to publish a whole anthology dedicated solely to offering a 
primer to those interested in Nietzsche political thought (a primer which also includes a chapter devoted 
to Nietzsche’s thought on democracy). See also Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau: 
Nietzsche’s Moral and Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Keith Ansell-
Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: the Perfect Nihilist (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); Tamsin Shaw, Nietzsche’s Political Skepticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000). 
4 This is not to say that authors who have taken these positions have been blind to the motivating 
factors of their opponents. Hatab, for instance, is at pains to explain how Nietzsche’s repudiation of 
‘substantive equality’ and ‘equal regard’ could be compatible with a democratic position. 
Access via CEEOL NL Germany
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meant by this and in doing so both contribute to a debate in Nietzsche scholarship 
and, more broadly, explore what it might mean to take up a democratic orientation 
toward the future, at least in line with Derrida’s analysis of democracy. 
I also aim to show that while Derrida offers a new of reading Nietzsche as 
democratic, this reading is subject to equally new criticisms, which expose new 
reasons for dismissing the idea that Nietzsche would endorse democratic values. In 
the final section of this paper I will consider an objection to Derrida’s reading that 
raises problems both for Derrida’s exegesis and for his philosophy. The objection is 
that Nietzsche would refute the motivational capacity of an indiscriminate openness to 
the future. Insofar as this objection highlights incompatibility between Derrida’s 
democratic orientation to the future and Nietzsche’s philosophy, it challenges Derrida 
as a reader of Nietzsche; insofar as it constitutes an objection to ‘democracy to come’ 
per se, it challenges the value of thinking about the future democratically. 
 
I 
Derrida’s account of the democratic aspect of Nietzsche took its most 
explicit form in ‘Nietzsche and the Machine’, an interview with Derrida concerning his 
publications on Nietzsche. Conducted in 1993, the interview precedes the publication 
of Politics of Friendship, Spectres of Marx and Rogues, publications which would 
comprise Derrida’s more influential studies of democracy. Asked how his own 
critique of the history of philosophy situates him in relation to Nietzsche’s critique 
of democracy, Derrida responds by saying ‘I do not consider Nietzsche to be an 
enemy of democracy in general’.5  
This is not a unique position; Nietzsche scholars who have argued for a 
‘democratic Nietzsche’ have found it necessary to narrow the scope of Nietzsche’s 
anti-democratic sentiments in order to leave room for theories of democracy compatible 
with Nietzsche.6 However Derrida adds that ‘Nietzsche critiques a particular form 
of democracy in the name of “a democracy to come”’.7 In other words, Derrida 
claimed that Nietzsche would have endorsed Derrida’s own analyses of democracy 
that followed in the 90s and the beginning of the 21st century; Derrida’s critique of 
extant concepts of democracy apparently echoes Nietzsche’s. But what would it mean 
                                                     
5 Jacques Derrida, Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
6 See especially Hatab (1995), chapter 3. 
7 Prima facie this is a hyperbolic and reductive comment typical of Derrida’s more accessible yet 
nevertheless often simplistic statements that can be found in interviews such as this. However it 
would appear that the suggestion that Nietzsche wrote in the name of a democracy to come is not 
exclusive to ‘Nietzsche and the Machine’. In light of this interview, closer inspection of Derrida’s 
political writings reveals that this claim is consistent with related scattered comments found throughout 
Derrida’s discussion of Nietzsche in, for example, Politiques de l’amitié (Paris: Editions Galileé, 1994). 
Rather than simply an isolated comment in an obscure interview, I hope to show throughout this 
paper that Derrida’s claims about Nietzsche’s critique of democracy resonate with a view that he 
held at least from the late 80s.  
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for either Derrida or Nietzsche to adopt this critical position? Let us take for example 
Derrida’s analysis of sovereignty in Rogues. According to Derrida, democratic 
sovereignty has a problematic role in democratic states insofar as its legitimating 
moment – polling day – is always at a distance from the moment in which a legitimate 
government exercises its power. For Derrida, this highlights the need for democratic 
authorities to perpetually repeat the process by which they come by that authority; 
an elected party can only have a temporary claim to power in a democracy, and at the 
very least must have another electoral mandate after a term, meaning that even an 
elected body cannot have the ‘last word’ in democratic politics.8 Derrida’s phrase 
‘democracy to come’ refers to that feature of democracy that denies anyone the last 
word and requires that democratic politics remain on ongoing process.9 Thus to say that 
Derrida, or Nietzsche, are critical of democracy in the name of a democracy to come, 
is to say that they are critical of the values championed under the name democracy 
in defence of the unending process that constitutes ‘democracy to come’. Derrida’s 
claim is, then, that Nietzsche defends the value of unending revision, and that this 
is a democratic value. 
This claim in the ‘Nietzsche and the Machine’ interview is coupled with a 
claim about how Nietzsche understands his place in history and in particular his 
relation to the future of Europe. Nietzsche’s orientation toward the future, we are told, 
is of a particular, ‘messianic’ kind, and it is this feature of Nietzsche’s work that 
Derrida takes to be democratic.10 What, then, does Derrida mean when he claims 
that Nietzsche’s work is ‘messianic’? To be messianic is to refuse to think of the 
future in terms of a finite set of possibilities, each with a pre-determinable character  
(‘I don’t know for sure if it will happen, but if it does I know what it will look like’) 
and each with calculable probabilities. To be messianic is to hope for an unanticipated 
different future state of affairs;11 this attitude affirms a transformation that alters 
                                                     
8 Hence Derrida’s obsession with taking turns and rounds of voting in the earlier sections of Voyous 
(Paris: Editions Galileé, 2003); see in particular Rogues, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael 
Naas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 6-41. 
9 For Derrida, this is an observation about what it is for something to be democratic, and thus extends not only to 
the legitimate authority of an elected party but also the legitimacy of the election process and more broadly the 
structure of a democratic state. In other words, for the process to be democratic in the same way that a party is 
democratically elected, that process must also be constantly open to revision. It is the broad scope of Derrida’s 
claims about what it is for something to be democratic that gives him the resources for an account of inter alia a 
democratic orientation to the future. (I am grateful to Peter Dews for raising this issue). 
10 ‘The messianic is heterogeneous to messianism in the precise sense that the messianic is indeterminable. 
Messianism will saturate the absence of horizon by turning it into a horizon. Not only would I want to show 
this through a fairly abstract analysis…but less abstract, more immediately, I would want to show the 
difference in, for example, the tone of Nietzsche, which is prophetic and messianic.’ Negotiations, 227. 
11 See ibid.: ‘all the predicates that seem to me to make up the concept of messianicity – annunciation of an 
unpredicatable future, relation to the other, affirmation, promise, revolution, justice, and so on’. Cf. Donner 
la Mort (Paris: Editions Galileé, 1993) translated by David Willis as The Gift of Death (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1995), 54: ‘We tremble in that strange repetition that ties an irrefutable past…to a future 
that cannot be anticipated; anticipated but unpredictable; apprehended, but, and this is why there is a future, 
apprehended precisely as unforeseeable, unpredictable; approached as unapproachable.’ 
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our situation or circumstances in a way that is not only unpredictable (in the way 
that the roll of dice is not predictable with certainty beyond a probability of 0.16) 
but that is presently indeterminable and unintelligible. In other words, our thought 
would be messianic were it to value and affirm changes that we believe cannot be 
understood until they take place. 
It is tempting to think of unintelligible change as “authentic” simply in the 
sense that it is a more radical change, but Derrida seems to have something else in 
mind. The kind of future that a messianic Nietzsche hopes for is in Derrida’s words 
‘the very condition of the future constituting messianism [hope for a future we can 
understand before it happens]’.12 Thus Derrida maintains that Nietzsche, as a messianic 
thinker, is concerned with a kind of future that is more fundamental to our experience 
of change than those changes that are intelligible before they occur. I take Derrida’s 
suggestion here to be that our regular ability to distinguish a finite set of future 
possibilities is made possible by more fundamental changes in the way we see the 
world; changes in the way we think, feel, experience and behave. We might distinguish 
on the one hand the transition from die-in-hand to rolled-a-6 (intelligible change), 
from on the other hand the transition from an experience of a six sided stone as just 
that, to ‘discovering’ that if we number these sides then we can base complex games 
on how this stone lands when I throw it.13 The range of things I can foresee happening 
with a six-sided stone will be characterised by how I experience it; if I understand 
it simply as a stone, then I might predict that one day it might be used to build a 
small house, or put together with other small stones in a bag to fashion some kind 
of blunt instrument or weight. If I undergo a change in the way I experience this 
object, I no longer experience it with this set of possibilities but with others (the range 
of numbers I might roll in the context of a game). In short, the set of possibilities 
intelligible to me is conditioned by the more radical changes that have already 
happened to the way the world appears to me. The important point to make here is 
that while I understand the stone as just a stone, ‘rolling a 6’ cannot make sense to me; 
such an event is unpredictable not because I am not sure that it will happen, but  
I because I do not even know what it would mean for it to happen.14 
                                                     
12 Negotiations, 227: ‘The messianic concerns a notion of the future that precedes – is the very condition of 
– the future constituting messianism.’ 
13 The word “discover” might of course imply that using a six sided stone as a die constitutes the realisation of 
a potential of the stone. This would be eschewed by Derrida for a number of reasons; but for the purposes of 
this discussion, it should be enough to say that the kind of fundamental change that Derrida is concerned 
with must be in principle unintelligible before it occurs. Talking of this in terms of the realisation of a 
potential can be misleading, insofar as it may imply that “rolling a 6” has in principle been intelligible for as 
long as six sided stones have existed, and in turn intelligible for as long as there has been matter that could 
have potentially taken the form of a six sided stone. This would run contrary to Derrida’s insistence that such 
a possibility is not ever-present. My thanks go to Steve Gormley for raising this. 
14 This alludes to an interesting question about history that would follow from this way of thinking about 
change over time: while the “stone-is-just-a-stone individual” (SI) could not understand the possibilities 
involved in rolling a die, could the “dice individual”(DI) know and understand the possibilities available 
to SI? If we maintain an Hegelian view of history, in which previous ways of understanding are 
subsumed under subsequent ways, it appears that DI might be able to retrospectively understand the 
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The messianic tone of Derrida’s Nietzsche consists of an affirmation of this 
more profoundly different, unpredictable future, if by affirmation we mean valuing this 
kind of future over the manageable possibilities that constitute our usual understanding 
of the passage of time. In other words, Derrida’s Nietzsche sees fundamental change in 
the way I experience the world as the proper object of orientation for those of us who 
wish to consider the future. Whereas for most, thinking about the future involves 
thinking about that which will happen “next Wednesday”, “in an hour”, or “after 
the baby is born”,15 Derrida’s Nietzsche will maintain that comporting oneself towards 
the future requires a comportment towards that which lies outside the set of currently 
intelligible possibilities.  
But what does it mean to describe this orientation to the future as democratic? 
As outlined briefly above, Derrida’s notion of democracy to come refers to what he 
believes to be the open-ended character of democracy; democracy in practice 
requires that we perpetually revisit our political decisions to establish new electoral 
mandates, and so a final decision, a last word, is never found in a democracy worthy of 
the name. In accordance with this analysis of democracy, to espouse democratic values, 
or to have a democratic attitude, is for Derrida to appreciate the value of this open-
ended process and the importance of a practice that resists the attraction of having 
the last word or coming to a conclusion. If our hopes for the future are informed by 
this democratic value, we will affirm radical changes in the way we think and hope 
for a future that poses challenges to our decisions.16 
Moreover, this democratic attitude would value the kind of transformation 
over time that would change the very possibilities open to us. This might be captured 
in the simple accommodation of change through a perpetual revisiting of an electoral 
mandate; but in a more profound sense, Derrida maintains that being democratic means 
                                                                                                                                       
possibilities for SI. One might then argue that there is an epistemological asymmetry to history; SI cannot 
understand DI, whereas DI can understand SI. Alternatively, one might argue that an alteration to the 
way I experience an object requires not only this narrow alteration, but an upheaval to the environment in 
which that object appears and perhaps a total change in the way I understand the world. If I undergo such 
a radical transformation in my understanding, then it would seem that this necessitates a complete rewrite 
of history; “stone” is reinterpreted in terms of what I experience as a die, and becomes “potential 
die” or “stone before we used it as a die”. We might then argue that this reinterpretation makes DI’s 
understanding of the historical uses of “potential dice” incommensurable with SI’s understanding, 
making it impossible for DI to understand the possibilities available to SI.  
15 Thus discursive understanding of time is not here restricted to time understood as the ticking hands 
of a clock. To conceive of a usual conception of time so narrowly would not, I believe, be very helpful; 
we undeniably structure a large part of our lives using a calendar and a watch, but we also structure 
our lives using less calculable temporal events, such as the birth of a child (“we’ll spend more time 
with our family once the baby is born”), the changing of governments (“our lives started to deteriorate 
when the coalition took office”) or the loss of a certain amount of weight (“when I reach my ‘target 
weight’ I’ll change my diet”). 
16 Cf. Rogues, 91: ‘The to of the “to come” wavers between imperative injunction (call or performative) 
and the patient perhaps of messianicity (nonperfomative exposure to what comes, to what can always 
not come or has already come).’ It is no coincidence, I think, that we here see Derrida reference the 
‘perhaps’ that constitutes so much of his discussion of Nietzsche in Politiques de l’amitié.  
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valuing an unforeseen moment when we rethink or reappraise what possibilities are 
intelligible to us. In this latter sense, Derrida describes an attitude that affirms an 
upheaval of the way we experience the world. And according to Derrida, this attitude 
towards the future, when rendered as a political regime, has its closest approximation 
in a democracy. Put more succinctly, the Derridean democratic attitude towards the 
future would be a political articulation of the messianic attitude toward the future 
that we have discussed above. And if Derrida is right about Nietzsche’s ‘messianic 
tone’, then he may have good reason for maintaining that Nietzsche evidences a 
democratic orientation toward the future. 
 
II 
We can give more content to this notion of a democratic attitude to the future 
by looking at the way Derrida thinks this attitude is manifest in Nietzsche’s work. In 
‘Nietzsche and the Machine’ Derrida lists a number of works that he maintains exhibit 
a ‘messianic tone’; he finds such a tone in, for instance, the following passage from 
Ecce Homo: 
Seeing that before long I must confront humanity with the most difficult demand 
that has ever been made of it, it seems indispensable to me to say who I am. Really, 
one should know it, for I have not left myself ‘without testimony’. But the disproportion 
between the greatness of my task and the smallness of my contemporaries has 
found expression in the fact that one has neither heard nor even seen me. I live on 
my own credit17 
Nietzsche claims that his own era has failed to understand him and that as a 
result of this he has had to live on his own credit. The understanding that Nietzsche 
seeks, the understanding he seems to need as some sort of fiscal endorsement, 
backing or funding (credit), has come from no-one but himself. According to Derrida, 
Nietzsche needs this credit for ‘His own identity – the one he means to declare and 
which, being so out of proportion with his contemporaries, has nothing to do with what 
they know by this name’.18 In other words, at the time Nietzsche writes Ecce Homo, 
the only reader who has understood him has been Nietzsche himself. This identity 
has been endorsed and supported (economically or otherwise) only by Nietzsche; it 
is not ‘by right of some contract drawn up with his contemporaries’. This leads Derrida 
to claim that the contract that ensures the support needed for Nietzsche’s identity is 
the ‘unheard-of contract he has drawn up with himself’.19 
                                                     
17 Friedrich Nietzsche Ecce Homo trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, [1908] 2004), 3.  
18 Jacques Derrida, L’oreille de l’autre: Otobiographies, transferts, traductions (Montreal: VLB Editeur, 
1982) translated by Christie McDonald as The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, transference, translation 
(Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 8.  
19 Ibid. 
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Nietzsche’s contemporaries have failed to act either as his creditor (unable 
to properly understand and invest themselves in engaging with Nietzsche’s texts) 
or as his debtor (i.e. have been unable to properly learn from and be indebted to 
Nietzsche’s texts). We could say that the credit agreement that Nietzsche draws up 
lacks a countersignature, as Derrida implies in Politics of Friendship: 
my [Nietzsche’s] readers to come, who will be my readers only if you 
become new philosophers – that is, if you know how to read me – in other words, 
if you can think what I write in my stead, and if you know how to countersign in 
advance or how to prepare yourself to countersign20 
Derrida describes the figures capable of reading (and properly comprehending) 
Nietzsche’s text as those who are able to countersign the contract that constitutes 
Nietzsche’s work. Nietzsche’s texts, along the lines of this reading, are effectively open 
contracts, a kind of blank cheque, signed by the author and awaiting the countersignature 
of a coming ‘new philosopher’ capable of properly understanding (investing in, perhaps 
acknowledging a debt to) Nietzsche’s thought.21 In other words, and according to 
Derrida’s reading, Nietzsche’s works go beyond the comprehension of Nietzsche’s 
contemporaries and effectively address themselves to a future, ‘new philosopher’. 
This philosopher of the future is the figure who will be capable of comprehending, 
learning from and countersigning Nietzsche’s contract. Until then, Nietzsche must 
live on his own credit. 
How does Nietzsche’s address to a future readership manifest a democratic 
attitude toward the future? Nietzsche undoubtedly desired a radical change in his 
contemporary culture. For Derrida, the cultural revolution Nietzsche desired is radical 
insofar as it alters the horizon of intelligible possibilities available to Nietzsche and 
his contemporaries. Thus for Nietzsche’s comportment to his readership to be messianic, 
his intended readership would have to be deferred to an era after a radical change 
in European culture. Most importantly, the full details of this change itself and the 
set of intelligible possibilities that is available to these profoundly different ‘new 
philosophers’ would have to be unintelligible to Nietzsche at the time of writing; the 
right readers are located beyond what is presently within his capacity to understand.  
If we recall the die example used above, we could say that just as experiencing 
a stone as just a stone means that I cannot understand the possibility ‘rolling a 6’, 
so Nietzsche cannot understand the possibilities available to his future readership. 
                                                     
20 Politics of Friendship, 41. I have stipulated that ‘my readers to come’ are Nietzsche’s readers; 
however, while it is clear that Derrida wishes to assert this of Nietzsche and how Nietzsche perceives his 
readership, there may be an argument for claiming that Derrida too understands his audience in a 
similar way. If this were the case, statements about ‘my readers to come’ may well refer to both Derrida 
and Derrida’s Nietzsche.  
21 As Derrida points out, not only is Ecce Homo’s preface signed nominally (F.N.) but the work is 
further signed with a date: ‘The page is dated. To date is to sign.’ (The Ear of the Other, 11). As per 
the usual format of a contract, Nietzsche not only signs but also dates his work. 
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And to take up a ‘messianic attitude’ in this context would be to value precisely this 
kind of reader. If Derrida is to attribute this kind of attitude to Nietzsche, he must 
locate it in exactly the kind of open-ended style that his open contract metaphor is 
designed to underline; if Derrida’s Nietzsche had anticipated the kind of reader he 
affirms, it would be inconsistent to maintain that this same Nietzsche is ‘messianic’.  
Derrida’s focus on Nietzsche’s credit metaphor is clearly underpinned by a 
distinctive way of understanding the cultural revolution that Nietzsche called a 
‘revaluation of values.’ According to Derrida the philosophers of the future who 
Nietzsche awaits are different not only in the sense that they cognitively evaluate 
the world in a significantly different way (they maintain a morality or table of values 
sufficiently different from a Christian- or slave-morality) but in the sense that the 
very set of future possibilities that are intelligible to them are fundamentally different 
and unintelligible to Nietzsche himself. The range of possibilities that they are able 
to consider is wholly distinct from the set of possibilities that Nietzsche himself 
can understand. Affirming the arrival of such a radically different generation would 
mean affirming a way of understanding the world and its possibilities that Nietzsche 
himself could not at the time of writing take up.22 In other words, affirming such a 
different generation would amount to hoping for the arrival of a way of being in the 
world that is not open to being understood by preceding generations. 
 
III 
This leads us to a particular problem for Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche. 
The problem concerns whether one can ever write in a way that addresses such a 
radically different future readership. If the messianic tone of Nietzsche’s untimely 
writing is supposed to address a readership yet to come, wouldn’t this require that 
Nietzsche transcend his era to share in the mode of thought found in the philosophers of 
the future? Does communicability between Nietzsche and his future readers presuppose 
some common linguistic or conceptual elements between writer and reader? And if this 
were the case, would this not require that Nietzsche anticipate that which, according to 
Derrida, precludes anticipation? In this section I will deal exclusively with this 
problem and Derrida’s answer to this problem. In the final section (IV), I will raise 
concerns that I believe Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche does not address. 
This problem, as I understand it, hinges on whether we claim that Nietzsche 
needs to share a way of thinking with his readership. If Nietzsche is to address 
himself to a certain kind of reader, must Nietzsche share some discursive content or 
                                                     
22 And possibly a way of understanding that Nietzsche would never be able to take up. One might 
legitimately ask of Derrida whether the profound change he associates with a democratic attitude 
toward the future can be located within a lifetime. In other words, can Nietzsche (or anyone) experience 
such a change to the possibilities he has available to his understanding, and affirm a profoundly 
different “Nietzsche”, or does his connection with his own history of contemporary culture require 
him to affirm a whole other generation – a problem Nietzsche himself was very aware of in considering 
the possibility of being ‘untimely’? 
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form – perhaps a shared semantics or grammar – with that kind of reader? If we 
answer yes, then there would seem to be something incongruous about claiming 
that Nietzsche both endorses a way of thinking that is wholly different to anything he 
can presently understand, and that he shares in this way of thinking. Derrida will 
claim that Nietzsche need not and indeed does not share a way of thinking with 
those future readers he values above his contemporaries. Rather, Derrida maintains 
that Nietzsche’s proper reader must in each case be singular, relating to Nietzsche’s 
work in a unique way.  
Derrida raised analogous concerns in his analysis of philosophies of friendship. 
According to Derrida, Nietzsche had questioned this tradition by challenging the 
value of a bond between similar persons and raising the possibility of an alternative 
mode of friendship.23 Nietzsche’s critique engenders a very different approach to 
friendship that is not based on commonality, shared interests or characteristics, or even 
proximity. Thus Derrida maintains that Nietzsche’s ‘friends’ are those unpredictable 
readers of the future we have discussed in relation to Nietzsche’s open contract. 
For Derrida, Nietzsche’s readers are ‘friends of solitude’ who engage in a 
friendship ‘without common measure, reciprocity or equality’.24 The inversion of 
the alleged canonical understanding of friendship here is I think clear enough; Derrida’s 
Nietzsche values those who co-exist in a way that maintains their interpersonal 
disparity rather than those who come together as a result of their common perspective.25 
However, as Derrida quite rightly notes, a collection of individuals who hold nothing 
in common and who evade proximity, equality, and mutuality would seem to undermine 
all that we would usually associate with the bonds of friendship, and perhaps has 
little right to claim even a radically different application of the word ‘friendship’.26 
What alternative notion could retain a bond of friendship, love, or community while 
endorsing solitude and distance? And similarly: in what sense could Nietzsche address 
himself to a readership with which he has nothing in common? 
The notion of a community without a bond of similarity, fraternity, consanguinity, 
or compatriotism is, as Derrida acknowledges, worryingly close to an untenable 
contradiction. This notion, which Derrida refers to as a ‘community without community,’ 
comes under much scrutiny in Politics of Friendship as he examines the possibility 
of an alternative way of constructing social bonds that would accommodate ‘friends of 
                                                     
23 Politics of Friendship, 27. 
24 Politics of Friendship, 35. 
25 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kristische Studeinausgabe in 15 Bänden Edited by Giorgio 
Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 9:3 [98], 1880 (my translation): 
‘The more the feeling of unity with others gains the upper hand, the more people become uniform, 
and the more all differences are seen as immoral. This is needed to create the sand of humanity: all 
very equal, very small, very round, very amicable, very boring. Christianity and democracy more than 
anything have driven man to being sand.’ 
26 ‘Why still call this ‘friendship’ except in a misuse of language and a diversion of a semantic tradition?’; 
Politics of Friendship, 35. 
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solitude’.27 It will pay us to spend a little time considering this phrase ‘community 
without community’ and its importance in Derrida’s study of friendship before 
returning to the problem at hand (we will see that Derrida’s answer to the questions 
I raised at the beginning of this section is inextricable from his understanding of a 
‘community without community’).  
Derrida owes the phrase ‘community without community’ to Georges Bataille, 
who addressed an absence of communitarian thought felt by many French intellectuals 
of the time.28 Picked up later by Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Inoperative Community and 
adopted once more by Maurice Blanchot in The Unavowable Community (which 
was no less a response to Nancy’s work than to Bataille), the phrase signified for 
Bataille a profound dissatisfaction with contemporary political groups and resonates 
with an ever increasing demand for a seemingly impossible non-institutionalised 
community. Blanchot recognises that this frustration was partly a reaction to the 
established notion of reciprocity in social relations. In Blanchot’s words, the 
shortcomings of a ‘Same with Same’ model of the communal bond reflected a need 
to incorporate the possibility of ‘the Other as irreducible’ in interpersonal relations. 
For Blanchot this raises difficult questions for communist philosophy in particular; 
the challenge for communism as Blanchot sees it is to reconcile communism and 
individualism, an interrelation of contradictory sentiments of ‘absolute immanence’ 
(the homogenous masses dissolved into work) and an individual’s ‘inalienable rights’. 
The question that Blanchot thus addresses is whether we can think of a community 
that does not undermine the individuality of the ‘irreducible Other’.29  
Blanchot’s discussion of community was in part a response to Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s The Inoperative Community, which was itself inspired by Bataille. The 
Inoperative Community identifies a nostalgic desire in the ‘community without 
community’ theme; this nostalgia, for Nancy, pines for something that has been effaced 
by institutionalised versions of companionship (political parties, for instance). Nancy’s 
use of the word ‘community’ refers to this element of our communal experience that is 
damaged or covered over by institutional delineation or legislation of communal bonds 
(the determination, for example, of the conditions of entry into a certain community). 
In an effort to dissociate his theory of community from traditional thought on the 
nature of community, Nancy suggests that community can be understood as being, 
insofar as it is not reducible to a totality of entities (and certainly not the enumeration 
of individuals in a group) or to an individual entity (what Blanchot calls ‘a supra-
individuality’).30 In this sense, community is for Nancy a relational space that precedes 
                                                     
27 Politics of Friendship, 47n.15. 
28 For more on this, see Pierre Joris’ preface in Maurice Blanchot La Communauté inavouable (Paris: 
Minuit, 1984) translated by Pierre Joris as The Unavowable Community (Barrytown: Station Hill Press, 
1988), xv-xx.  
29 Blanchot (1988), 2-3. 
30 See Jean-Luc Nancy La Communauté désoeuvrée (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1983) translated by 
Peter Connor as The Inoperative Community (Minneapolois, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1991), 7. 
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our articulation of what we think is shared in a community. According to Nancy, 
different cultures and societies have attempted to understand this primordial origin 
of communal experience through a certain hegemonic narrative. Nancy calls this form 
of story-telling ‘myth’. For Nancy, myth has historically engendered the conceptual 
reflexivity of our societies and has led us to believe that we have understood what 
constitutes the bonds of our communities. For Nancy, however, community is that 
which always exceeds our attempts to explain our communal origins; community 
takes shape not in myth itself but in the interruptions of myth, or rather in the 
instances when we find that the constitutional delineation of the conditions of our 
community becomes questionable.31 
An important caveat for Nancy’s appropriation of the term ‘community’ is 
his rejection of the term ‘individuality’ in favour of ‘singularity’.32 For Nancy, 
community concerns singularity and precedes the intersubjective bonds that connect 
individuals. In a similar sense, Blanchot’s account of ‘the Other’ as singular 
individual incommensurable with a homogenous collective demands respect for the 
irreducibility of singularity. Finally, Derrida brings this issue of singularity to bear 
on our models of friendship, our models of democratic social interaction, and our 
models of the relation between author and reader. Blanchot’s ‘irreducible Other’, in 
the context of the disparity between communism and individualism, and Nancy’s 
inoperative community, contingent not on a myth of common origin but on the 
deconstruction of this myth, are both attempts to understand the problems that 
singularity raises for a model or paradigm of community.  
Returning to the problem raised in this section: how would Derrida explain 
Nietzsche’s ability to address himself to a radically different readership? The problem 
arises when we want to communicate content in the form of a book or essay to a 
reader who cannot share my way of thinking. If we discuss this with particular regard 
to a cultural revolution that would constitute the ‘revaluation of values’, a revolution 
Nietzsche associates with ‘coming philosophers’,33 we could say that Derrida’s 
Nietzsche faces a problem if he intends to prescribe to these future philosophers 
certain ways of proceeding with this revolution. If I ask or demand that you perform 
X, X being one of a set of possibilities available to you, then we must share a 
mutual understanding of X i.e. X must be within both my range and your range of 
intelligible possibilities. As discussed above, this kind of mutual understanding is 
not the kind of relation that Derrida sees in Nietzsche’s addresses to future readers.  
This would, I suggest, be a problem for Derrida’s reading if he claimed 
that Nietzsche both valued an unanticipated readership and addressed prescriptions 
to this readership. However, while the former is central to his reading – indeed, it is 
                                                     
31 Nancy (1991), 43-70. 
32 Nancy (1991), 6-7. 
33 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut and Böse translated by Walter Kaufmann as Beyond 
Good and Evil (New York: Vintage, [1886] 1989), §2. 
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that which Derrida thinks makes Nietzsche democratic – the latter is not a part of 
Derrida’s interpretation; Derrida’s Nietzsche does not prescribe substantive guidance 
to his readers to come. The task that Derrida faces thus becomes elucidating an 
alternative way in which Nietzsche, or any author, could orient himself to future 
readers. This is I believe the problem that occupied Derrida’s treatment of Nietzsche in 
Politics of Friendship and led him to consider what a ‘community without 
community’ would be. Derrida’s answer, inspired by Bataille, Blanchot and Nancy, 
is that one can value that which is unique to a person, and that one can do this through 
hoping for moments when our established conditions for joining our community 
are challenged. In the words of the tradition in which Derrida places himself, one can 
value ‘singularity’ or ‘the Other’ rather than principles that determine the sufficient 
conditions for being my friend. 
Analogous to this analysis of community or friendship, Derrida will assert 
of Nietzsche that his alternative to the bond of commonality between writer and 
reader is to value readers who read his works an irreducibly unique way. The ‘friends 
of solitude’ that Derrida identifies as Nietzsche’s intended readers are said to be 
valued not for their capacity to understand Nietzsche’s work in the way Nietzsche 
himself did, but for their capacity for relating in a singular way to the content of 
Nietzsche’s writing. If Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche is accurate – an exegetical 
issue to which I will turn in the final section – then Nietzsche does not require a 
common understanding between himself and his awaited readers. Instead, Derrida’s 
Nietzsche values those readers who will appropriate his thought in a way that breaks 
with traditional reception of his work – singular readings that challenge paradigmatic 
accounts of Nietzsche’s thought. According to Derrida, Nietzsche’s intended readers, 
equated in Politics of Friendship with his ‘friends of solitude’, are sufficiently unique 
to remain heterogeneous to models of how-to-read-Nietzsche, even a model that may 
have originated with Nietzsche himself.34 Derrida’s Nietzsche, then, is not so much 
concerned with the successful communication of content as he is with the way he 
his read, and whether his readers are singular in their appreciation of his work. 
With Derrida’s full account of Nietzsche’s readership in view, I want to return 
to Derrida’s claim that Nietzsche is democratic. I explained in section one that 
Derrida thinks that Nietzsche is democratic insofar as he values perpetual revision 
of our way of viewing the world and appreciates the importance of resisting having 
the last word in philosophical, political or moral discussion. More specifically, 
Derrida thinks that Nietzsche’s comportment to the future is democratic insofar as it 
affirms such radical cultural transformation that Nietzsche cannot himself prescribe 
those changes in advance; being democratic, for Derrida, means hoping for a time 
when not only our decisions are revised but the very possibilities that are open to 
us have altered. 
                                                     
34 They are ‘friends of solitude’ in the sense that they cannot be accurately grouped together with other 
readers – they stand alone. 
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This orientation to the future, for Derrida, is evidenced in the way Nietzsche 
thinks of his readership. Derrida’s Nietzsche intends to be read by those new 
philosophers who exceed Nietzsche’s present understanding; Nietzsche affirms a 
reader who not only has a different philosophical or moral perspective, but has a 
transformed range of possible interpretations of his work at her disposal. For Derrida, 
Nietzsche’s orientation to his readers is such that Nietzsche resists having the last 
word on his own work, and that he affirms interpretations that challenge established 
conventions regarding the meaning of Nietzsche’s writing. In short, Derrida maintains 
that Nietzsche has a characteristically democratic orientation to the future reception 
of his critique of modern Europe. 
 
IV 
My aim in this paper has been to reconstruct a reading of Nietzsche offered by 
Derrida in order to understand a) his novel interpretation of the political implications 
of Nietzsche’s critique of modernity b) what it would mean for Nietzsche, or 
indeed anyone, to have a democratic orientation to the future and c) how such a 
thing might be possible for an author addressing future readers. Most of this paper 
has been dedicated to explaining Derrida’s contribution regarding a) and b). With 
regards to c), I have addressed one potential problem with valuing a radically different 
reader and suggested that Derrida has an answer to this problem. What I have not 
done is argued that Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche is accurate. I have concerns 
about his reading that have kept me from doing this, and I want to explain these 
concerns in this final section. These concerns will also point to a fourth issue which 
I also have not yet dealt with in this paper: d) whether a democratic orientation to 
the future (at least how Derrida describes it) might be valuable.  
Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche and democracy has the benefit of incorporating 
the virtues of other democratic readings of Nietzsche without facing the same 
problems as those readings. Others who read Nietzsche as democratic emphasise 
his resistance to dogmatic law with universal applicability; it is important to Nietzsche 
that individuals are not dissolved into a homogeneous mass or ‘herd,’ and accordingly 
that our ethical codes do not erode the singularity of creative individuals. But this 
alone does not warrant reading Nietzsche as democratic, as the liberation of great 
individuals from a herd mentality is not only possible in a democracy. We might 
say that pluralism is an underdetermined inference from Nietzsche’s objection to 
herd homogeneity. In fact, Nietzsche claims that great individuals have been supported 
by hierarchical societies, suggesting that an aristocratic ‘pathos of distance’ has 
been necessary to the development of an ethic of self-overcoming that drives the 
cultivation of creative individuals (Beyond Good and Evil §257). Nietzsche’s resistance 
to social homogeneity appears to lead him more in the direction of aristocracy than 
democratic pluralism. 
Derrida’s own version of this reading acknowledges this same worry about 
homogeneity in Nietzsche. But Derrida’s Nietzsche responds to modern herd mentality 
not by advocating a democratic pluralism, but by affirming singular future readers 
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of his work. Derrida’s Nietzsche is not democratic in virtue of his support for a 
pluralistic society, but is democratic in virtue of his support for heterogeneity in the 
future of Europe. In this way Derrida’s reading is able to locate democratic values 
in Nietzsche’s style and hopes for the future, and incorporates Nietzsche’s valorisation 
of individuality, while avoiding the underdetermination problem facing those who 
infer pluralism from Nietzsche’s valorisation of individuality. 
However, Nietzsche’s claim that social hierarchy is indispensable to strong 
or healthy culture is potentially a difficult problem for those, including Derrida, 
who want to read any democratic sentiment in Nietzsche. Many of those who have 
reacted critically to the pro-democratic Nietzsche literature have drawn attention to 
Nietzsche’s anti-egalitarianism, particularly Nietzsche’s lament of the decline of 
pre-modern aristocratic orders of rank.35 Any reading of Nietzsche as democratic 
must undoubtedly account for these strong anti-egalitarian sentiments. The question we 
must ask of Derrida is whether the form of egalitarianism entailed by a democracy to 
come (that which Derrida ascribes to Nietzsche) contradicts Nietzsche’s objections 
to the levelling instincts of modern egalitarianism.  
Derrida’s democracy to come does entail a particular kind of equality. If 
Derrida is right, then Nietzsche foregoes attempts to determine in advance what 
constitutes a good and a bad reading of him. If he were to do otherwise, according 
to Derrida’s reading, then he would fail to genuinely affirm the value of singular 
interpretations yet to come – he would be making proscriptions, and running into 
the problem highlighted in section IV. This refusal to evaluate in advance constitutes 
a particular mode of egalitarianism. However, this kind of egalitarianism is distinct 
from the homogenising equality that Nietzsche objected to. Derrida’s critique of Nancy 
in Rogues explicitly states the former’s commitment to a distinct mode of equality:  
As soon as everyone...is equally (homoiōs) free, equality becomes an integral part 
of freedom and is thus no longer calculable. This equality in freedom no longer has 
anything to do with numerical equality or equality according to worth, proportion 
of logos. It is itself incalculable and incommensurable equality; it is the unconditional 
condition of freedom, its sharing, if you will.36  
Derrida distinguishes the equality that affirms singularity from an equality 
that renders individuals calculable. The latter is understood as an equality in virtue 
of a common measure, a metric applicable to all by which we can calculate the worth 
of individuals; we are equal insofar as we are allotted the same value according to 
this common metric. The version of equality that Derrida repudiates is also the kind 
of equality that Nietzsche criticises in his best known anti-egalitarian passages. 
Nietzsche’s distaste for the “democratization of Europe” focuses on the homogenising 
effect of the dissolution of middle age chivalric or aristocratic orders. In Beyond 
Good and Evil §242, for example, Nietzsche tells us ‘Europeans are becoming more 
similar to each other’ as they become ‘increasingly independent of any determinate 
milieu.’ Nietzsche’s problem with this is not with equality per se, but with an equality 
                                                     
35 See for instance Thomas Hurka, ‘Nietzsche: Perfectionist’ in Nietzsche and Morality ed. Brian Leiter 
and Neil Sinhababu (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
36 Rogues, 49. 
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that brings with it a herd mentality and precludes the development of the kind of 
great individuals he finds in ‘healthy aristocracies’. Derrida would no doubt agree that 
there is something wrong with herd-like equality, either among friends or among a 
political community. There is no disagreement between Derrida and Nietzsche with 
regard to this kind of equality.  
The same cannot be said, however, for the kind of egalitarianism that is 
integral to democracy to come. This alternative notion of equality might best be 
understood as a negatively defined equality; rather than ascribing a positive equal 
value to all, the egalitarianism of democracy to come foregoes evaluative comparison 
between individuals, and thereby precludes positive statements of inequality (X is 
less valuable than Y). In a word, we could say that the democratic orientation endorsed 
by Derrida is indiscriminate with regards to that which is yet to come. To determine in 
advance our trajectory into the future, to discriminate between better and worse ways 
of proceeding, would according to Derrida introduce a future horizon that shuts out 
singular possibilities. And to do this would, for Derrida, be undemocratic. 
This indiscriminate hope for any future change is, I submit, not something 
that Nietzsche would endorse. As mentioned above, the value of hierarchy in Nietzsche 
(most often discussed in terms of Nietzsche’s supposedly aristocratic politics) has 
often been cited against attempts to ‘democratise’ Nietzsche. The significance of 
hierarchy for Nietzsche can of course be read in many ways, and presents itself in a 
number of forms in Nietzsche’s later works. One such way is a hierarchy of drives 
internal to the ‘soul’; having one drive ‘come out on top’ in order to dominate all 
others impulses and inclinations internal to the self can above all else be a strong 
motivation to activity.37  
The question of what conditions help motivate creative activity is undoubtedly 
of great importance to Nietzsche. With his contemporaries’ foundational belief systems 
ebbing away, much of Nietzsche’s late concerns are preoccupied with what he sees 
as the miserably insufficient attempts of modernity to continue in a positive and 
constructive way. Neither the utilitarianism of the ‘last man’ (among others, according 
                                                     
37 In the same way that, as suggested in Nietzsche’s earlier work, a pluralistic culture can only be a strong culture 
when under an overarching and unifying principle. This is especially prominent in his account of Wagner’s 
development as a cultural revolutionary capable of reviving tragedy and uniting the future of Germany under a 
Gesamtkunstwerk. See Friedrich Nietzsche Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen IV translated by R.J Hollingdale as 
Untimely Meditations IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1876] 1997); for an account of Wagner’s 
philosophical influence on Nietzsche’s early hopes for a unified culture, see Julian Young ‘Richard Wagner and 
the Birth of The Birth of Tragedy’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16:2 (2008), 217-45; and for 
an example of Nietzsche’s mature articulation of this sentiment, see Nietzsche [1886], §260. Nietzsche’s 
account of unifying a pluralistic culture through an overarching principle bears much resemble to his celebration 
of unified individuals. For recent discussion of this theme in Nietzsche see Ken Gemes ‘Nietzsche on Free Will, 
Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual’, in Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy ed. Ken Gemes and Simon 
May (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Paul Katsafanas ‘The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche, 
Plato and Schiller,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy (forthcoming), Simon May ‘Nietzsche and the Free 
Self’ in Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy and Robert Pippin ‘How to Overcome Oneself: Nietzsche on 
Freedom’ in Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. 
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to Nietzsche, Mill) nor the pessimism of the nihilist (among others, Schopenhauer), 
suffice as reactions to the collapse of a theologically grounded ethical horizon. 
These two ways of proceeding lack an urgent desire for upheaval, transformation 
and improvement precluded either by the conservatism of the last man (maximising 
one’s happiness in accordance with currently available petty pursuits) or the 
resignation of the nihilist (improvement is not possible). 
The problem with the messianic attitude of democracy to come is that it 
cannot give the normative grounds for actively transforming the current situation; it 
lacks, we might say, the capacity to motivate present action. Hope for a radically 
different future can at best motivate me to clear the ground for a cultural revolution, 
but gives me no guidance as to how to actively involve myself in this revolution.38 
Derrida will insist that the democracy to come places an urgent demand to act on 
us, and at times is at pains to deny a quietistic effect of deconstruction.39 Derrida 
may well be warranted in thinking this, but it is not the case that Nietzsche would 
agree, and by extension it is not the case that Nietzsche himself thinks that a 
democratic attitude toward the future is the right response to modern nihilism.  
Nietzsche’s emphasis on the value of hierarchy, and the decline of social 
hierarchy, suggests to us that a lack of discrimination is precisely what is nihilistic 
about late modernity. If the death of God means a dearth of normative authority, 
and with it the absence of cultural distinctions between right and wrong or good 
and bad, then for Nietzsche an indiscriminate hope for the future is no more than a 
symptom of late modernity’s lack of normativity. In short, Derrida’s democracy to 
come would for Nietzsche be just another symptom of modern nihilism; doing no 
more than hoping for something different is a manifestation of nihilism, not the 
way Nietzsche wants us to respond to it. 
Derrida does appreciate the bind that Nietzsche himself is in. Nietzsche is 
aware that he is a product of his own time to some extent; his strong desire to be 
untimely (take, for instance, the way in which Nietzsche takes pride in being 
misunderstood in by his contemporaries) speaks to Nietzsche’s frustration with the 
fact that he is writing in a time of decadence and cannot help but be somehow sullied 
by this. Nietzsche’s problem then is that he could not trust his own revaluation of 
values. This cultural revolution must be left to those who have made a clean break 
                                                     
38 This criticism of messianism will be familiar to those who have charged Marxism with the same 
problem. Marxists have repeatedly tussled over whether Marx’s teleological theory of history asks 
us to prepare for a proletariat revolution, or bring it about ourselves. In other words, do we hope for 
a future so different to our own that we would sully it by involving ourselves in its creation? Or 
does the creation of communism require action in the present to realise that future? 
39 ‘My pointed reference to urgency is meant to suggest that in the necessarily finite time of politics 
and thus of democracy, the democracy to come certainly does not mean the right to defer, even if it 
be in the name of some regulative Idea, the experience or even less the injunction of democracy…The 
to-come of democracy is also, though without presence, the hic et nunc of urgency, of the injunction as 
absolute urgency. Even when democracy makes one wait or makes one wait for it;’ Rogues, 29. 
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from late modern nihilism. Derrida’s reading acknowledge that Nietzsche can do 
no more than wait and hope for those who have made this clean break. But the 
problem with Derrida is that he has turned this messianic hope – for Nietzsche, the 
only option in an era of degeneration and empty values – into something valuable 
in itself. This is, I submit, where Derrida and Nietzsche disagree on the value of 
democracy. 40 
                                                     
40 For comments and suggestions I am grateful to Pete Bloom, Steve Gormley, David McNeill and 
Peter Dews. 
